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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the opportunities of momentum and contrarian profits on the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange during quiet and turbulent times. In our investigation we employ daily values of the 
main indexes from the Bucharest Stock Exchange for two periods of time. During the first period, 
from January 2005 to September 2008, the Romanian capital market was relatively quiet and it 
experienced an ascendant trend. In the second period, from September 2008 to March 2012, the 
global crisis induced significant turbulences on the financial markets. We analyze the opportunities 
of momentum and contrarian profits based on the reactions to positive and negative shocks of the 
indexes returns. We find that global crises induced significant changes on the investors’ behavior. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The possibility to obtain profits on the capital markets by exploiting knowledge
about the past evolutions of stocks is one of the main controversial subjects of the financial 
literature. One of the main principles of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) stipulates that 
it is not possible to build successful investment strategies based on the past values of the 
financial assets (Fama (1991)). Among the arguments used to contest EMH there were 
theories about momentum and contrarian strategies in which the past performances played a 
major role. A momentum strategy is based on the investors’ expectations that the present 
ascendant and descendent trends of stock prices will continue for a specific horizon. Such 
investors will buy the past winner stocks and they sell the past loser stocks (Chan et al.,
(1996); Hong et al., (1999); Jegadeesh and Titman (2001); Yu and Chen (2011)). A 
contrarian strategy presumes that the present trends, ascendant or descendent, could not 
continue for long time and they have to go to reversal. In these circumstances, an investor 
could take advantages by buying the past loser stocks and selling the past winner stocks 
(Chan (1988); Lakonishok et al., (1994); Conrad et al., (1997); Daniel et al., (1997)). 
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On short terms, momentum and contrarian strategies could be analyzed in the
framework of the stock prices reactions to positive or negative shocks. Usually, the positive
shocks are caused by unexpected and extreme good news, while the negative shocks are
generated by unexpected and extreme bad news. Besides EMH, there are two main 
hypotheses on the stock prices reactions to shocks: Overreaction Hypothesis (OH) or 
Underreaction Hypothesis (UH). OH describes exaggerated initial reactions to shocks in 
which the investors rush to sell stocks when negative shocks occur or to buy stocks when
positive shocks arrive. They correct such overreactions lately by reversal behaviors 
(DeBondt and Thaler (1985)). These overreactions generate opportunities for contrarian 
profits (Atkins and Dyl (1990); Jegadeesh and Titman (1995)).  UH presents delayed initial 
reactions to shocks in which investors wait to see the future developments before they 
decide to buy or sell stocks. After they become aware about the amplitude of the shocks 
they correct such underreactions by reversal behaviors (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)).
Underreactions to shocks could be fructified by momentum strategies (Rouwenhorst 
(1998); Hong et al. (2000); Lee and Swaminathan (2000); Hameed and Kusnadi (2002); 
Chui et al., 2005). 
Empirical researches revealed some particularities of investors’ behaviors in the 
context of shocks on the capital markets. There were identified significant differences 
between the investors from developed and from emerging markets (Harvey (1995); 
Schnusenberg and Madura (2001); Forner and Marhouenda (2003); Antoniou et al., 2006; 
Dumitriu et al., 2012; Elsayeda (2012)). Some papers discovered changes induced by 
turbulences on the financial markets (Chui et al., 2000; Lasfer et al., 2003; Stefanescu et 
al., 2012). The firm size could also play a major role in the reactions to shocks (Zarowin 
(1990)). 
In this paper we approach the opportunities of momentum and contrarian profits on 
the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) before and during the global crisis. Beginning with 
2005, the success of economic reforms and the recovery of the national economy attracted 
foreign capitals which generated a significant increase of the stock prices. The ascendant 
trend of BSE was amplified by Romania’s adhesion to European Union. However, since 
September 2008, the effects of the global crisis caused turbulences on the Romanian 
financial markets. We investigate the short term momentum and contrarian profits based on 
the reactions to shocks.  
The rest of the paper is organized as it follows: the second part describes the data 
and methodology employed in our investigation, the third part presents the empirical results 
and the fourth part concludes.  
 2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 We analyze the opportunities for momentum and contrarian profits by employing 
daily closing values of the main indexes from the two components of BSE: BET, where 
there are listed all the big Romanian companies, and RASDAQ, where there are listed 
smaller firms. We use the main five indexes of the BET market: 
- BET, that describes the price movement of the most liquid 10 companies listed on 
the BVB regulated market; 
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- BET-C, which reflects the evolution of all the big companies listed on BSE, 
excepting the investment funds (SIFs); 
- BET-FI, that expresses the price movement of the investment funds (SIFs); 
- BET-XT, which reflects the evolution of the most liquid 25 shares traded on the 
BSE, including SIFs; 
- BET-NG, that expresses the evolution of companies which have the main business 
activity located in the energy sector and the related utilities. 
We also use three main indexes of RASDAQ market:  
- RASDAQ-C (RAQ-C), which reflects the prices evolution of all the stocks, traded 
on RASDAQ market; 
- RAQ-I, that expresses the prices of the stocks listed on the First Category of 
Excellence on RASDAQ market; 
- RAQ-II, which describes the prices of the stocks listed on the Second Category of 
Excellence on RASDAQ market. 
           For these indexes we employ a sample of data, provided by BSE, for the period 
January 2005 – May 2011, excepting for BET-XT and BET-NG which were introduced in 
January 2007. We split this sample into two sub-samples: before and after 15
th
 of 
September 2008 (the day when it was announced the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers). 
For each index i we calculate the raw return (ri,t) applying the formula:  
100*
1,
1,,
,
−
−
−
=
ti
titi
ti
P
PP
r                         (1)       
                          
where Pi,t and Pi,t-1 are the closing prices of index i on the days t and t-1, 
respectively. 
For any trading day t we determine the extrapolated indexes returns based on the 
trend of the values from the previous n trading days (in this paper we estimate the trends
with additive models of time series). We identify shocks by comparing these expected 
values with the effective raw returns. As a measure to reveal the significant differences we 
calculate, for a period of N past trading days, a value ((DIF(ri,t,N)) given by the formula: 
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where N is the length of the period of the past values taking into consideration, ri,k is 
the raw return of index i for a day k previous to the day t and EV(ri,n,k) is the extrapolated 
value of ri,k estimated based on the values from previous n day (it is obviously that 
DIF(ri,t,N) is calculated similar to a standard deviation if we consider the extrapolated value 
as a mean). 
We consider that a positive shock occurs in a day t
+
 if the following condition is 
satisfied: 
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,
 is the return of the index i from the day t
+
 and  EV(ri,n,t) is the 
extrapolated value of the raw return of index i in the trading day t, estimated based on the 
values from previous n day. 
We also consider that a negative shock occurs in a day t
-
 if the following condition 
is satisfied: 
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where  
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,
 is the return of the index i from the day t
-
. 
We choose the length of the period of time by which we determine the expected 
values of returns as n=36 and the length of the period of time by which we calculate 
DIF(ri,t,N) as N=40. 
In order to separate the autonomous shocks from the positive or negative shocks we 
exclude the successive shocks (a successive shock is one that occurs less than 10 days after 
an autonomous shock).  
For each autonomous shock we calculate the post-shocks abnormal returns (ARi,t) 
applying the formula: 
         ARi,t = ri,t - EV(ri,n,t)            (5)        
                  
Based on post-shocks abnormal returns we compute the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns for the next 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 days as: 
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where λtiCAR ,  is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the index i for the next λ days 
that follow an autonomous shock from a day t. 
We determine the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the index i for the next 
λ days ( λtiACAR , ) as: 
∑
=
=
λ
λ
λ 1 ,,
1
t
titi CARACAR     (7)
We test, for each autonomous shock, the significance of Average Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns by employing t-statistics. The results of the tests serve us to classify the 
after shock behaviors of returns into three categories: 
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- Overreactions, when a positive shock is followed by significant negative abnormal 
returns or when a negative shock is followed by significant positive abnormal returns; 
- Underreactions, when a positive shock is followed by significant positive 
abnormal returns or when a negative shock is followed by significant negative abnormal 
returns; 
- Efficient reactions, when we don’t find significant positive or negative abnormal 
returns after an autonomous shock.  
                   
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Table 1 presents the positive and negative shocks of the Romanian capital 
markets before the global crisis. The small number of shocks in the case of BET NG and 
BET XT is explained by the fact that two indexes appeared in 2007.  For the other three 
indexes of BET market the number of shocks and shocks amplitudes are compared to those 
from RASDAQ market. 
Table 1  
Shocks before the global crisis  
Positive shocks Negative shocks Index 
Number of 
shocks 
Mean reaction Number of 
shocks 
Mean reaction 
BET 17 3.19355 
(14.1445***) 
19 -3.4803 
(-9.68605***) 
BET C 16 2.73045 
(16.4011***) 
19 -2.81139 
(-9.73442***) 
BET F1 19 5.08148 
(16.2484***) 
12 -4.34178 
(-7.51085***) 
BET NG 6 4.28899 
(7.89387***) 
7 -3.93922 
(-8.6743***) 
BET XT 9 3.38941 
(10.7173***) 
7 -4.65194 
(-5.97615***) 
RAQ C 15 4.06553 
(2.46947**) 
15 -3.58999 
(-2.53999**) 
RAQ I 20 5.07097 
(17.2318***) 
13 -4.2546 
(-12.2272***) 
RAQ II 24 4.35131 
(15.2579***) 
19 -4.53159 
(-9.15519***) 
Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 
levels, respectively 
In the Table 2 there are presented the shocks that occurred during the global crisis.  The 
results suggest that for two indexes of RASDAQ market, RAQ I and RAQ II, the negative 
shocks were more consistent in comparison with other indexes. 
Table 2  
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Shocks during the global crisis  
Positive shocks Negative shocks Index 
Number of 
shocks 
Mean reaction Number of 
shocks 
Mean reaction 
BET 24 4.7159 
(8.39162***) 
16 -4.70198 
(-6.12657***) 
BET C 21 4.14009 
(7.30198***) 
18 -4.49713 
(-6.54035***) 
BET F1 15 6.60801 
(6.42653***) 
17 -5.54686 
(-6.86784***) 
BET NG 19 5.27693 
(7.34187***) 
17 -3.62578 
(-6.93405***) 
BET XT 19 4.91063 
(6.83067***) 
17 -4.81911 
(-7.16176***) 
RAQ C 21 2.05268 
(9.66552***) 
19 -1.63441 
(-8.34577***) 
RAQ I 23 5.76727 
(9.76543***) 
22 -8.65336 
(-5.23267***) 
RAQ II 26 8.73894 
(9.66653***) 
29 -8.31704 
(-13.3913***) 
Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 
levels, respectively 
The cumulative abnormal returns that followed a positive shock before the global crisis are 
presented in the Table 3. Four of the five indexes of BET market underreacted: BET and 
BET C for the second day after the shock, BET F1 for a period that includes the first three 
days and also for the fifth day, BET NG for the fourth day. For the last index, BET XT 
efficient reactions occurred. From the RASDAQ market, the first two indexes: RAQ C and 
RAQ I experienced efficient reactions while the third, RAQ I, overreacted. 
Table 3  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a positive shock before the global crisis 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
BET 0.469361 
(0.995522)
1.41301 
(2.29383**)
0.775074 
(1.31819) 
0.65647 
(0.858507)
0.325171 
(0.344602) 
0.168423 
(0.0960519)
BET 
C 
0.478918 
(0.877387)
1.14112 
(1.77331*) 
0.850445 
(1.08572) 
0.580231 
(0.553566)
0.546445 
(0.525658) 
1.40862 
(0.960796) 
BET 
F1 
1.65605 
(2.01844*)
1.48944 
(2.06248*) 
1.80092 
(0.06543*) 
1.40411 
(1.39512) 
2.14446 
(1.80526*) 
1.22505 
(0.594146) 
BET 
NG 
2.27438 
(1.79517) 
3.72402 
(1.94969) 
2.80868 
(1.66784) 
3.53679 
(2.22091*)
3.56518 
(1.7285) 
3.02278 
(1.05957) 
BET 
XT 
1.06316 
(1.36721) 
1.26674 
(1.30521) 
0.54402 
(0.445988) 
0.47619 
(0.390916)
0.0772399 
(0.0464174)
1.52411 
(0.570481) 
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RAQ 
C 
0.126431 
(0.452575)
0.00460905 
(0.0144148)
-0.171299 
(-0.4071) 
-0.00337 
(-0.0065) 
-0.45023 
(-0.619964) 
0.785376 
(0.563272) 
RAQ 
I 
0.862095 
(1.3843) 
0.675927 
(0.949644) 
0.671264 
(0.859227) 
0.959258 
(1.23492) 
1.33969 
(1.32333) 
0.809663 
(0.577686) 
RAQ 
II 
-1.13626 
(-3.19***) 
-1.49832 
(-2.5561**) 
-1.33935 
(-2.099**) 
-1.23666 
(-1.55406) 
-1.12233 
(-1.31706) 
-0.673162 
(-0.521429) 
Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 
levels, respectively 
The Table 4 exhibits the cumulative abnormal returns that followed a negative shock before 
the global crisis. The results indicate only efficient reactions excepting the index RAQ I 
which experimented an underreaction five days after the shock. 
Table 4  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a negative shock before the global crisis 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
BET 0.121124 
(0.297079) 
0.786029 
(1.27393) 
0.680102 
(0.803132) 
0.282563 
(0.306176) 
-0.09005 
(-0.1022) 
0.993243 
(0.63106) 
BET 
C 
-0.222571 
(-0.48547) 
0.177105 
(0.295225) 
0.0013180 
(0.001875) 
-0.192765 
(-0.2398) 
-0.127176 
(-0.16127) 
0.438466 
(0.31488) 
BET 
F1 
0.489334 
(0.419542) 
0.747457 
(0.639068) 
-0.188487 
(-0.11938) 
-1.31188 
(-0.75755) 
-2.28231 
(-1.16644) 
-1.61785 
(-0.99244) 
BET 
NG 
-0.163338 
(-0.15477) 
0.211074 
(0.188721) 
-1.21473 
(-0.69114) 
-0.959451 
(-0.72228) 
-0.989561 
(-0.55238) 
-0.224672 
(-0.11041) 
BET 
XT 
1.02307 
(1.01414) 
1.00741 
(0.990408) 
1.17209 
(1.00869) 
0.695771 
(0.535622) 
0.370819 
(0.205647) 
-0.246743 
(-0.0899) 
RAQ 
C 
-0.097459 
(-0.6421) 
0.000401 
(0.001134) 
-0.372877 
(-0.66312) 
-0.49144 
-0.78569 
-0.477704 
(-0.645694) 
-1.40908 
(-1.35107) 
RAQ 
I 
0.00300039 
(0.005680) 
-0.994105 
(-1.38093) 
-0.939622 
(-0.92405) 
-2.02661 
(-1.45943) 
-2.71729 
(-1.86623*) 
-2.20763 
(-1.12963) 
RAQ 
II 
0.835444 
(1.1629) 
1.10272 
(1.23045) 
0.927913 
(0.9904) 
1.82843 
(1.59353) 
2.01488 
(1.46245) 
2.4551 
(1.19925) 
Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 
levels, respectively 
The cumulative abnormal returns that followed a positive shock during the global crisis are 
presented in the Table 5. From the BET market only an index, BET F1, overreacted for a 
period that included the third and the fourth day after a shock. The rest of the four indexes 
experienced efficient reactions. All the three indexes of RASDAQ market overreacted: 
RAQ C for the fourth day after a shock, RAQ I for the tenth day after a shock and RAQ II 
for the fifth and the tenth day after a shock. 
 374
Table 5  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a positive shock during the global crisis 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
BET -0.14782 
(-0.18645) 
-0.533491 
(-0.66143) 
-0.082875 
(-0.1045) 
-0.02838 
(-0.03299) 
-0.362272 
(-0.2943) 
-1.31286 
(-0.6965) 
BET 
C 
0.440011 
(0.640859)
0.0454728 
(0.0765387)
0.340914 
(0.520984) 
-0.174141 
(-0.19149) 
-0.735224 
(-0.507) 
-2.12478 
(-1.0034) 
BET 
F1 
-0.078826 
(-0.09035) 
-0.435869 
(-0.54271) 
-1.75016 
(-2.002*) 
-3.0021 
(-2.87**) 
-2.50412 
(-1.3856) 
-5.27871 
(-1.618) 
BET 
NG 
0.594143 
(0.662842)
0.184999 
(0.242963) 
0.250716 
(0.317211) 
0.114392 
(0.130927)
-0.470307 
(-0.4015) 
-1.28113 
(-0.551) 
BET 
XT 
-0.744857 
(-1.02933) 
-0.969523 
(-1.29514) 
-1.00707 
(-1.34266) 
-1.11909 
(-1.43088) 
-0.631876 
(-0.5325) 
-2.62664 
(-1.0777) 
RAQ 
C 
-0.258449 
(-0.97877) 
-0.470143 
(-1.25847) 
-0.685515 
(-1.54918) 
-0.884134 
(-1.8113*) 
-0.472498 
(-0.89664) 
-0.211071 
(-0.30823) 
RAQ 
I 
0.169583 
(0.3632) 
-0.465301 
(-0.566802) 
-1.06336 
(-1.37177) 
-2.07312 
(-1.47361) 
-2.56495 
(-1.60387) 
-6.07491 
(-2.872***) 
RAQ 
II 
-0.943855 
(-1.63162) 
-0.981937 
(-1.09954) 
-1.8517 
(-1.5483) 
-1.61856 
(-1.63392) 
-1.9903 
(-1.70837*) 
-3.77283 
(-2.894***) 
Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 
levels, respectively 
The Table 6 presents the cumulative abnormal returns that followed a negative shock 
before the global crisis. Two indexes of the BET market overreacted: BET for the fourth 
and fifth days after a shock and BET C only for the fourth day after a shock. Another index, 
BET F1, underreacted for the tenth day after a shock while the rest of two indexes, BET 
NG and BET XT experienced efficient reactions. Two of the RASDAQ market indexes, 
RAQ C and RAQ II reacted efficiently while the other index, RAQ I, overreacted for a 
period from the second to the fourth day after a shock. 
Table 6  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns following a negative shock during the global crisis 
Index AR-1 ACAR-2 ACAR-3 ACAR-4 ACAR-5 ACAR-10 
BET -0.010016 
(-0.01289) 
-0.437816 
(-0.3280) 
1.22231 
(0.812214) 
2.81355 
(1.98627*) 
2.37638 
(1.86575*) 
0.554978 
(0.292326) 
BET 
C 
-0.16509 
(-0.25192) 
-0.511624 
(-0.4737) 
1.10401 
(0.865101) 
2.49634 
(1.96529*) 
1.67231 
(1.44876) 
0.387378 
(0.244268) 
BET 
F1 
-0.51043 
(-0.50557) 
-2.49528 
(-1.3583) 
-3.72426 
(-1.64937) 
-3.74114 
(-1.28899) 
-2.79298 
(-1.20148) 
-5.23891 
(-1.927*) 
BET 
NG 
0.137029 
(0.268295)
-0.968339 
(-0.7037) 
-0.919951 
(-0.62956) 
0.179233 
(0.115944) 
-0.0728 
(-0.05797) 
-1.49825 
(-0.98315) 
BET 0.081869 -0.409631 0.889277 2.24026 1.99448 1.28702 
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XT (0.106777) (-0.3025) (0.59936) (1.58527) (1.45807) (0.536165) 
RAQ 
C 
-1.20124 
(-1.26757) 
-1.38956 
(-1.38263) 
-1.29349 
(-1.28314) 
-1.18131 
(-1.09829) 
-1.25123 
(-1.15828) 
-1.05287 
(-0.898078) 
RAQ 
I 
0.494707 
(1.02509) 
0.899937 
(1.76239*) 
1.63085 
(2.29251**)
1.66414 
(2.36891**) 
1.03542 
(1.14578) 
0.191073 
(0.122034) 
RAQ 
II 
-0.129876 
(-0.17185) 
1.04459 
(0.938356) 
1.05367 
(0.943913) 
1.56823 
(1.24867) 
2.00314 
(1.51264) 
2.84109 
(1.68253) 
Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 
levels, respectively 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we investigated the short term opportunities for momentum and 
contrarian profits on BSE. We identified these opportunities based on the analysis of the 
reactions to shocks of eight main indexes of BSE. The results revealed different behaviors 
after shocks that could be linked to the size effect and to the recent global crisis. 
Before the global crisis, most of the BET market indexes underreacted after positive 
shocks generating opportunities for momentum profits. Instead, for RASDAQ market a 
single index overreacted causing opportunities for contrarian profits, while the other two 
indexes reacted efficiently. In the same period of time, we found no opportunities for 
momentum and contrarian profits on BET market after negative shocks since all indexes 
reacted efficiently. We found, instead, that an index of RASDAQ market underreacted 
generating opportunities for momentum profits.  
During the global crisis, our investigation revealed opportunities for contrarian 
profits after positive shocks for a single index of BET market (BET-FI) and for all three 
indexes of RASDAQ market. In the case of negative shocks we found opportunities of 
contrarian profits for two indexes from BET market and an index from RASDAQ market, 
while for BET-FI results indicate opportunities for momentum profits. 
The different reactions from the two components of BSE could be explained by the 
fact that the main actors on BET market were foreign investors which, instead, don’t find 
attractive the RASDAQ market. The global crisis induced significant changes on investors’ 
behaviors in the presence of shocks on the markets. For some indexes the pessimism of 
investors led to a replacement of momentum profits opportunities with contrarian profits 
opportunities. In that period of time the stock prices reactions of the investment funds 
(reflected by the index BET-FI) were opposite to the stock prices from other industries. 
This investigation could be extended to the study of events that provoked shocks on BSE. 
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